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Abstract 
Most companies in Nigeria adopt corporate governance practices without 
really knowing the resultant effects on share price. Although there have been 
numerous research efforts on corporate governance and company 
performance in Nigeria, little has been done concerning finding out the 
effects of the corporate governance practices of listed Nigerian companies on 
share price, which is one of the most obvious aspects of company affairs. 
This study therefore aims to find out the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and share price. The corporate governance 
mechanisms under study are ownership structure and the audit committee, 
while share prices over a three-year period have been related to these 
mechanisms. The sample size comprises thirty companies listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange, while the regression and correlation analysis were 
used to test the hypotheses. The empirical findings suggest that ownership 
structure have a negative association with share price, whereas the audit 
committee is positively related to share price. The study recommends that 
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board members’ shareholding should be regulated to ensure an optimal 
share price disposition.  
Keywords: Ownership structure; Audit Committee, Share Price; Governance 
Introduction 
Several studies on companies around the world in the last two decades 
suggested that the heightened focus on corporate governance has no positive 
impact on corporate performance (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily & Ellstrand, 
1996; Rosenstein &Wyatt 1997; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2001 and Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2005). However, interest in corporate governance has grown 
tremendously in the past decade with the general feeling that sound financial 
performance excuses poor governance (Pic, 1997). Corporate scandals, 
environmental concerns and globalisation have all played their part in raising 
shareholders‘ and public awareness on how companies should be governed. 
The recent international disasters in financial reporting including Enron and 
Worldcom in the US, Parmalat in Italy, the Maxwell saga in the UK, Daewoo 
in Korea, Leisurenet and Regal Bank in South Africa, CADBURY and 
Oceanic bank in Nigeria confirmed the growing need for transparency in 
governing companies. 
In other studies, it was observed that good corporate governance has been 
evident to be associated with greater firm performance (Carcello and Neal 
2003; Attiya and Robina, 2007). As seen in these studies, in any organisation, 
the share price is the first brief pinpoint when one thinks about an indicator 
for the performance of a listed company. If it is on an increase, the default 
reaction is that things are going well in that corporation and people do buy 
the shares. However, if it is on a decline, one may not be so sure about the 
way the business is shaping up its operations. As observed by Klein (1998), 
implementing a better corporate governance practice is anticipated to 
improve the monitoring of management and reduces information asymmetry 
problems. This invariably will increase the firm‘s value. 
In the same vein, Sanda, Mukailu and Garba (2005) observed that, in 
developing economies especially in Nigeria, failure to implement standard 
corporate governance procedures has been the bane of the financial 
disposition of numerous corporations today.  Also, the lack of investor 
participation in the assets of a company, usually affects its share price 
history; which summarizes the quality of operations of the company. In 
addition as observed by Heaps (2010), many listed companies are ignorant of 
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the relationship that subsists between their corporate governance structures 
and their seemingly impressive or unattractive share prices. Most of these 
companies adopt corporate governance practices without really knowing the 
resultant effects on share price. Furthermore, despite numerous research 
efforts on corporate governance and company performance in Nigeria, little 
has been done concerning finding out the effects of the corporate governance 
practices of listed Nigerian companies on one of the most obvious aspects of 
company affairs i.e. share price. 
It is against these backdrops that this study therefore aims to find out the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and share price 
among listed firms in Nigeria. This paper is divided into four sections. The 
introduction part constitutes section one, while section two covers the review 
of related literatures and previous empirical studies. Section three covers the 
methodology and the result of empirical analysis and the final section 
includes the discussion of findings, conclusion and recommendations. 
The Scope of study 
This study covers the banking and the manufacturing industries in Nigeria. 
Fifteen firms each were selected from both listed banks and manufacturing 
firms, in other to investigate the effects of corporate governance mechanisms 
(ownership structure and audit committee‘s independence) on firms‘ share 
price.The annual reports of the selected firms for three years period between 
2007 and 2009 were studied. This period, being the period when most of the 
corporate scandals occurred.  
Research hypotheses 
In other to achieve the objectives of study, the following hypotheses stated in 
their null form were tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The ownership structure of listed companies in Nigeria has no 
significant relationship with their share prices. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between the audit 
committee’s independence and share prices of listed companies in Nigeria. 
Literature review 
Corporate governance defined 
There are numerous literatures on corporate governance today. In 
understanding the concept of corporate governance, the definition by 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a good 
starting point. The principles of corporate governance are widely recognized 
benchmarks in corporate governance. In the financial sector, they are one of 
the key sets of standards for an excellent financial system as used by the 
Financial Stability Forum. They are used by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank in country assessments, and by other international 
bodies such as The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in standard setting (World Bank, 1999).  
The OECD principles of 1999, define corporate governance as involving ―a 
set of relationships between a company‘s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence 
of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company 
and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence 
that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy.‖  
Corporate governance and shareholder returns 
Several literatures have linked corporategovernance to firm‘s performance 
(Gompers, Ishi and Metrick, 2003; and Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmermann, 2004), the multiplicityof results is also increasing. All these 
studies only differ by the difference in methodologies, the performance 
proxies and differences in governance indices throughout the world. Good 
corporate governance can serve as an instrument for enticing investors as 
well as influencing the stock price. The average premium investors who are 
willing to pay for good governance have been estimated to be between 11% 
and 16% in the US (Agrawal et al. (1996). In Europe, Brown and Caylor 
(2004) showed that better corporate governance is related to better firm 
performance, and his study concluded that better governed firms perform 
better than poorly governedfirms. 
Gompers et al. (2003) found a significant association between a corporate 
governance index built from 24 provisions and stock returns. More 
specifically, they found that investors who are investing in firms, which are 
ranked high, based on this index, are on average earning 8.5 % abnormal 
returns. They also observed that weaker governance measures exhibit lower 
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firm valuations, while in addition they are more engaged in acquisitions and 
capital investments.  
In developing economies, Klapper and Love (2003) found evidence for the 
relationship between firm‘s performance and corporate governance. By 
employing a corporate governance ranking, developed by Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia, and using asample of 495 companies from 25 developing 
markets they found that a positive relationship existed between the corporate 
governance ranking and financial ratios. 
In the case of Germany, Drobtez, Schillhofer and Zimmerman (2004) 
concluded that a corporate governance rating is positively correlated with 
firm value. They discoveredthat an investment strategy that bought 
companieswith high corporate governance ratings and sold shortcompanies 
with a low rating, would have gained 12%annualised abnormal returns for 
the sample period.With regard to the effect of corporate governance on the 
expected rate of return for shareholders, Lombardoand Pagano (2000) 
suggested that the expected rateof return should compensate investors for 
expectedmonitoring, auditing, and other private costsassociated with different 
corporate governancesystems. In their model, stronger corporategovernance 
mechanisms in firms reduce the expectedreturn on equity to the extent that it 
reduces theshareholders‘ monitoring and auditing costs. 
Corporate governance in Nigeria 
Corporate governance has recently assumed considerable significance as a 
veritable tool for ensuring corporate survival. This is because business 
confidence usually suffers each time a corporate entity collapses. In Nigeria, 
most of the business failures in the recent past are attributed to failure in 
corporate governance practices. For instance, the collapse of banks in Nigeria 
in the early 1990s and onwards was as a result of inadequate corporate 
governance practices such as insider-related credit abuses, poor risk 
appreciation and internal control system failure (Sanusi, 2010). To stem the 
tide in corporate failure, scholars and practitioners (Sanda et al, 2005; 
Ogidefa, 2008 and Rasid, 2008) have consistently advocated different 
approaches to corporate governance. According to Ogidefa (2008), a critical 
tool in corporate governance is disclosure and transparency. This as opined 
by Ogidefa negates adequate disclosure on the risk profile by most Nigerian 
firms. 
Corporate Governance & Share Price: Evidence from Listed Firms in Nigeria  
 
Copyright© IAARR 2013: www.afrrevjo.net  134 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
 
The topic of corporate governance gained importance in Nigeria during the 
post structural adjustment programme (SAP) era. This era witnessed the 
growth of private ownership of productive resources and the multiplication of 
banks and financial institutions. Because of the weak corporate culture in 
these banks, the nation witnessed a very high incidence of corporate failure 
and distress (Oluyemi, 2006). To regain the confidence of the public, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission set up a committee in 2000 whose 
report was the first to articulate a code of best practices for public companies 
in Nigeria. This was followed by a similar code by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) in 2006 to address corporate governance practices in Nigerian 
banks. The Central Bank of Nigeria (2006) traces the need for a new code of 
corporate governance in Nigerian banking industry to the poor corporate 
governance practices in the banks which have been identified as major 
factors in virtually all known instances of corporate collapse.  
The occurrence of the high profile corporate governance scandal involving 
Cadbury Nigeria Limited also reiterated the need for stringent measures as 
regards compliance to corporate governance policies and codes. In June 
2006, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) expressed concern on 
issues arising from Cadbury‘s annual reports and accounts for 2005, 
particularly in the areas of inadequate disclosure, non compliance with 
corporate governance code and obtaining loans for the payments of dividends 
to shareholders, contrary to SEC regulation. The apex regulatory body in the 
capital market (SEC) also penalised and reprimanded Akintola Williams, 
Deloitte (AWD), the external auditor of the company and the Union 
Registrars Ltd for violating the provisions of the investments and securities 
act of 1999. Ever since, corporate governance practices in Nigeria has been a 
major discuss. 
Data analysis method 
This study examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms proxied by ownership structure and audit committee and share 
price (dependent variable) of 30 listed firms in Nigeria between 2007 and 
2009.   
To enable the examination of the relationship between corporate governance 
and share price, a linear regression model equation was used.  The constructs 
include corporate governance and share price. The regression equation can be 
computed as: 
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Y = β0 + β X1 +µit............................................................................ (1) 
Where: 
y =Share Price (Dependent variables) 
x = Corporate Governance (Independent variables) 
β= Coefficient 
µit = Error term 
Equation 1 can be more clearly defined as: 
Share Price = f (Corporate Governance) + c..................................... (2) 
Equation 2 is further expanded by introducing the constructs of corporate 
governance, and including a control variable (Earnings per Share), hence 
formulating equation 3. This is to enhance predictability and easy analysis of 
the relationship which is between the two constructs (corporate governance 
and share price). 
Share Price = (Ownership structure and Audit committee Independence) + 
Earnings per share (EPS).................................................................. .. (3)                                 
The above can be deduced to: 
SPit = OWSit + ADCIit + EPSit ............................................................. .(4) 
The model specification based on regression is: 
SPit =β0+ β1OWSit + β2ADCIit + EPSit +µit.......................................... (5) 
Where- 
SP= Share Price; which is the price at which one unit of a company‘s stock is 
sold. The share price is calculated by adding up the daily average share prices 
of the companies under study and dividing the result by the number of days 
the shares are traded. 
ADCI= Audit Committee; which is derived by dividing the number of 
shareholders in the committee by the total number of members. 
OWS= Ownership structure; which is the percentage of board members who 
own shares against total board members.     
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EPS= Earnings per share; which represents how much money shareholders 
would receive for each share of stock they own if the company distributed all 
of its net income for the period. This is obtained from the annual reports of 
the companies under study. 
β = Coefficient of parameters 
µ= Error term, which captures other explanatory variables not explicitly 
included in the model. 
it = time coefficient; i.e. for firm i in year t 
The study adopts the regression analysis method in analysing the impact of 
the independent variables on the performance of the listed manufacturing 
firms in Nigeria.  The Pearson correlation also measured the degree of 
association between variables under consideration.  
Descriptive statistics result 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum 
Maxim
um Mean Std. Deviation 
SHARE PRICE 90 1.85 264.17 26.8298 43.02938 
OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 90 .28 100.00 49.1418 37.77444 
AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
INDEPENDENCE 
90 .00 .50 .4772 .06251 
EARNINGS PER 
SHARE 
90 -542.93 180.52 4.2544 67.12403 
Valid N (listwise) 90         
Source: (Computed output SPSS, 2013). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of both the 
dependent and the independent variables for all the companies in the sample. 
It shows the maximum, minimum, average and the standard deviations of the 
variables used.  
The results from the analysis of the share price (SP) shows that the highest 
share price is 264.17 and the lowest is 1.85 with a standard deviation of 
43.03%. Using the mean, the statistics on ownership structure (OWS) 
indicate that a barely significant portion (49.14%) of shareholder board 
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members own shares among the total members of the board of directors. The 
statistics on the audit committee (ADC) show that the shareholder to director 
ratio (47.77%) is less than expected (50%), although it is expected that the 
number of shareholders equate the number of directors on the committee. 
The results also indicate that the mean of earnings per share (EPS) is 4.25%, 
while the maximum and minimum are 180.52 and -542.93 respectively. 
Restatement of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The ownership structure of listed companies in Nigeria has no 
significant relationship with their share prices. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between the nature of the 
audit committee’s independence and share prices of listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
Table 2: Correlation Result 
    Share 
Price 
Ownership 
Structure 
Audit 
Committee 
Earnings Per 
Share 
Share Price Pearson Correlation 1 -.020 .093 .013 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   .854 .384 .906 
  N 90 90 90 90 
Ownership 
Structure 
Pearson Correlation -.020 1 -.070 -.230(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .854   .513 .029 
  N 90 90 90 90 
Audit 
Committee 
Pearson Correlation .093 -.070 1 .017 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .513   .877 
  N 90 90 90 90 
Earnings Per 
Share 
Pearson Correlation .013 -.230(*) .017 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .906 .029 .877   
  N 90 90 90 90 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Researcher’s Field Summary Result (2013) 
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From the correlation results in table 2, a negative correlation coefficient (r) of 
-0.20 was observed between the dependent variable (SP) and ownership 
structure (OWS).  Based on the correlation analysis criteria, the coefficient 
value of -0.20 means that there is a very low negative relationship between 
share price and ownership structure. Furthermore, the correlation result was 
insignificant at any of the levels. 
However, a positive correlation coefficient (r) of 0.093 was observed 
between share price (SP) and the audit committee (ADC). The coefficient 
value of 0.093 means that there is low positive relationship between share 
price and the audit committee. The correlation result was also highly 
significant at 1% and 5%. This invariably suggests that the higher the number 
of shareholders compared to directors on the audit committee, the better the 
share price value of the company. 
Control variable (EPS) 
A positive correlation coefficient (r) of 0.013 was observed between EPS and 
Share Price. This indicates a low positive relationship between EPS and share 
price. The results were however insignificant at 1% and 5%. This means that 
EPS has a positive relationship with the share price value of a company. 
Regression analysis 
Table 3: Model summary (b) 
 
a) Predictors: (Constant), Earnings Per Share, Board Composition, 
Ownership Structure, Audit Committee 
b) Dependent Variable: Share Price 
Source: Computed output (SPSS, 2011) 
Table 3 shows how much of the variance in the dependent variable (SP- share 
price) is explained by the independent variables in the model (ownership 
structure, audit committee and earnings per share). In this case, the R square 
value is 0.226 means that the model explains 22.6% of the variance in the 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .476(a) .226 .190 38.72452 
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dependent variable (share price). While the Adjusted R Squared compliments 
this variance. 
Table 4: ANOVA (b) 
Mod
el 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 37320.921 4 9330.230 6.222 .000(a) 
  Residual 127464.996 85 1499.588     
  Total 164785.917 89       
a) Predictors: (Constant), Earnings Per Share, Board Composition, 
Ownership Structure, Audit Committee 
b) Dependent Variable: Share Price 
Source: Computed output (SPSS, 2011) 
The significance of the F -value in table 4 above shows that the model employed 
is not biased.  
Table 5: Coefficients (a) 
a) Dependent Variable: Share Price 
Source: Computed output (SPSS, 2011).   
As observed in table 5, the tolerance values for all the variables tested are 
greater than 0.1. This indicates that there is no multi-colinearity between the 
independent variables.  Also, the variance inflation factor (VIF) values are 
 Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
    B Std. 
Error 
Beta   Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 7.021 32.586   .215 .830     
  Ownership 
Structure 
-.048 .112 -.042 -.429 .669 .939 1.06
5 
  Audit Committee 212.026 72.509 .308 2.924 .004 .820 1.21
9 
  Earnings Per 
Share 
-.006 .063 -.010 -.098 .922 .946 1.05
7 
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less than 10. The VIF result indicates that the variables measured are 
acceptable and free from multi-colinearity problem. 
From the t- table, the correlation coefficient between Ownership Structure 
and Share Price is negative   (-0.48), indicating a negative relationship 
between the number of shareholders on the board and share price. This 
invariably means that, higher number of shareholders on the board of 
directors has negative effects on share price. This is viewed to be because an 
excessive amount of shareholding among directors may allow for selfish 
decision making and greedy corporate planning. Also, the result further 
indicate that when directors own a large proportion of shares of the firm, they 
could pose other agency problems, especially those associated with conflicts 
between large and small shareholders. This relationship is seen to be 
insignificant at 5% and 10% level (.669). The null hypothesis is therefore 
accepted while the alternate hypothesis is rejected in Hypothesis 1. The result 
is consistent with Wei (2003) and Lin (2007). 
However, the correlation coefficient between the Audit Committee and Share 
Price is positive (212.026), indicating a positive relationship between the 
composition of the audit committee and share price. This implies that the 
appropriate composition of the audit committee has a positive effect on share 
price. This relationship therefore leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
and the acceptance of the alternate hypothesis in Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the Audit Committee and Share Price is significant 
at 5% and 10% as it has a significance level less than 0.05 (.004). 
Additionally, there is a low negative relationship between the control 
variable, Earnings Per Share and Share Price, (-.006) which indicates that a 
high EPS does not necessarily hype share price. The relationship is however 
not significant, as the level of significance is greater than 0.1 (0.922). 
Conclusion and recommendations 
This study therefore conclude that in the wake of the recent global economic 
recession, listed companies around the world have begun to strengthen their 
listed status by making moves to enhance the value of their shares, thereby 
ultimately enhancing shareholder‘s value. One of the most important moves 
is embedded in corporate governance, considering that it is a process 
designed to align interests of management with those of shareholders, and a 
mechanism to hold management accountable to the company‘s equity 
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owners. Furthermore, given the requirement for firms to have an audit 
committee, the study also conclude that any differential in performance 
related to governance is usually related to the differences in audit committee 
characteristics (especially its independence). This is because the 
independence of the audit committee facilitates more effective monitoring on 
financial reporting and external audits. This will further improve the quality 
of financial decisions and exhibit more of governance characteristics.  
Finally, the paper concludes that when directors own a large proportion of 
shares of the firm, they could pose other agency problems, especially those 
associated with conflicts between large and small shareholders. 
The study therefore recommends that there should be a moderate amount of 
shareholding among the board of directors in Nigeria dictated by relevant 
corporate bodies, to avoid excessive amount of shareholding which may 
allow for selfish decision making and greedy corporate planning. In addition, 
companies should ensure that the audit committees comprise an equal 
number of shareholders and directors at all times, as it has a positive 
relationship with share price. 
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